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In 1996, significant amendments to the SafeDrinking Water Act (SDWA) were adopted thatreflected the concerns of many in the drinking
water industry to define the performance of water
utilities in broader terms. Prior to this time, water
systems that were providing safe drinking water on
a consistent basis were considered “viable,” and
failing systems were termed “non-viable.” The
SDWA amendments discarded this binary
measurement system and formalized the idea of
“capacity,” which now encompasses the technical,
management, and financial aspects of delivering safe
drinking water to the public. Instead of a pass-fail
basis of measuring performance, capacity could be
measured along a continuum. This article focuses
on the measures of financial capacity that reflect
the commitment of managers and boards of directors
regarding the long-term funding requirements of
drinking water systems.
This new concept of capacity required the
regulated community of water systems—as well as
the regulators and other stakeholders—to develop
measures of capacity to determine the point upon
the capacity continuum where systems would be
more likely than not to be sustainable. State drinking
water programs were required to develop measures
of technical, financial, and managerial capacity for
proposed water systems as well as for those seeking
to borrow money from the new Drinking Water State
Revolving Fund (DWSRF) for system
improvements. Many states have used those capacity
measures to examine existing water systems and to
search for those needing capacity building assistance.
Regarding financial capacity, the Idaho Drinking
Water Program uses eleven indicators that describe
the fiscal capacity and financial management of
water systems seeking state revolving loan funds.
Among these are indicators that can be used either
to compare the capabilities of water systems that
are similar in size or to track financial performance
of an individual system over time. From such
comparisons, we can draw inferences about the
financial indicators that correlate with the reliability,
safety, and cost of providing safe drinking water.
Experts believe that the long-term success of
water systems is related to keeping their capital
facilities in good shape. This means not only investing
in the water system when it is built, but also
anticipating the costs of replacing it when it wears
out. Regulatory agencies have devoted program
resources toward improving the sustainability of
public water systems. In 2003, the U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA), for
example, released two handbooks for water system
managers addressing the topics of strategic planning
and capital asset management (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2003a; 2003b).
Acting to Reduce Risk in Delivering
Essential Services
As required by law and regulation, water system
board members and officers are obligated to deliver
safe drinking water to their customers. Running a
water system like a business is not only what
customers want (and assume), it is an appropriate
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approach given the complexity of the task of
producing and delivering safe drinking water. Without
good management, a system will not be able to meet
future challenges. Poor planning puts the water
system finances and its customers’ health at risk.
As financial capacity measures have been instituted
by the state drinking water programs, we are
beginning to learn about the relatedness of poor
planning and troubled water systems.
Capital Budgeting and Capital
Improvements Planning
Within general purpose governments, or as special
units of government, utility operations (such as water
systems) are considered business enterprises: the
full cost of a water system should be supported by
the customers who purchase service. Given this
expectation, how do water systems perform?  Are
these water “businesses” in danger of going out of
business?
Looking beyond water testing results to discover
the viability or capacity of water systems reveals
that small water systems can be dangerously close
to being unsustainable even while they continue to
supply water. Over the past five years, the
Environmental Finance Center at Boise State
University (EFC) has reviewed the financial capacity
of water systems seeking capital improvement
resources from the DWSRF—the Idaho Drinking
Water State Revolving Fund (20 reviews)—and the
Alaska Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (8
reviews). A review of the descriptive statistics
generated from the Idaho reviews indicates that
smaller systems do a poor job of capital budgeting
and capital improvements planning (Environmental
Finance Center, 2004). The effects of the lack of
long-range financial planning for these water systems
are also reflected in their financial records and
reports.
In Idaho, 78 % of the systems seeking taxpayer-
subsidized low-interest financing from the DWSRF
did not meet minimum standards for capital budgets
and capital improvement plans. These water systems
presented no evidence that future infrastructure
needs had been identified, either for replacing worn-
out assets or for acquiring the new structures or
materials necessary for supplying safe water. Not
surprisingly, these DWSRF applicants presented
neither a funding strategy nor a capital budget for
existing or proposed infrastructure improvements.
Given the lack of evidence of formal long-term
planning, is it possible that some measure of the long-
term responsibility for maintaining capital assets is
occurring informally, as part of the operating budget?
Infrastructure upkeep and repair should be occurring
as part of the operating budget as an operating
expense. For systems without formal capital
budgeting and capital improvement plans, the annual
operating expenses could conceivably include some
of the longer-term replacement and expansion
funding needs of the system because, at the
operations level, field staff might not distinguish short-
term maintenance and repair from long-term asset
or component replacement. A couple of financial
indicators may be used to detect if monies are
available for the water system to use for capital
replacement: the operating ratio and the sales-to-
net fixed assets ratio.
A common financial indicator—the operating
ratio—explains that these small Idaho water systems
do not have the excess operating financial resources
necessary for sustaining long-term service quality.
The median operating ratio (operating revenues
compared to operating expenses) for the Idaho
DWSRF applicants was 1.33. After operating
expenses are paid, the balance of revenues is
available for reserves, debt service, and depreciation
or system replacement costs. While the median value
for the Idaho applicants seems reasonable, one water
system demonstrated an operating ratio of 0.90 (the
maximum ratio was 2.42). In this case, operating
expenses exceeded operating revenues, a situation
requiring the commitment of prior-year retained
earnings, deficit financing, or some other means to
meet operating costs. This is an unsustainable recipe
for system operations.
It is not unusual for water system managers to
believe that a “balanced budget”—where an
operating ratio would be equal or close to 1.0—is
acceptable. This view ignores the capital expenses
that are essential for system longevity.
Another common financial indicator that
underscores the responsibility to fund capital
replacement is the ratio of sales to net fixed assets.
Assuming that water sales provide the revenues for
both operations and capital asset replacement and
acquisition, the components of this ratio provide a
wealth of information for consideration.
Small water systems require tremendous
investments in capital assets before a drop of water
can be supplied to their customers. For example, it
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is not unusual for small towns of one or two hundred
people to face the challenge of installing $500,000
of treatment equipment to meet new regulatory
standards. Revenues from water sales must support
the operation, maintenance, and replacement of
facilities needed to deliver safe water. The sales-to-
net fixed assets ratio demonstrates the ability of the
utility assets to generate sales. If the population
served is small, the user fees collected from water
sales may be insufficient to support that investment.
The Idaho DWSRF applicants’ sales-to-net fixed
asset ratio median value was 0.26 and can be
interpreted as a return on capital investment of 26%.
For most businesses this would be an attractive return
on investment. Note, however, that the ratio of sales
to net fixed assets for capital intensive businesses
must be higher than for capital-lean enterprises. In
other words, sales must be generated at a level to
support the operational and other non-operating
expenses of the capital-intensive business.
The following example demonstrates the
challenges a system would face where sales are
low in relation to capital investment needs. Imagine
a water system that has a net fixed asset value of
$1 million, with a sales-to-net fixed assets ratio of
26% (generating water sales of $260,000) and
operating expenses of  $195,000 (using the Idaho
median operating ratio of 1.33). After subtracting
operating expenses from sales, only $65,000 remains
for debt service, reserves, anad system replacement.
Assume further  $15,000 of that $65,000 is necessary
for annual debt service. The remainder of $50,000
could be available for reserves, system replacement,
and capital acquisition expenses. A prudent approach
would sequester additional sums for emergencies
and professional engineering services—say a total
of $20,000 annually. After all of those expenses are
counted against sales, only $30,000, or the equivalent
of 3% of the asset value, remains for replacement.
This is a very small sum for a capital-intensive
enterprise.
Business enterprises fund the wear and tear on
capital assets used in the production process through
sales receipts to replenish their production capability.
If a water system’s production assets are not
expensed to the customers that use up those assets,
someone other than those customers will need to
replace the system when it wears out. In our
example above, the remainder of $30,000—after
operating and other expenses are paid—would not
come close to the annual expense of capital
replacement funding  regardless of whether a
depreciation or asset replacement methodology is
being used to replenish the capital investment in the
system.
Although the data set is smaller for Alaska utilities,
the EFC’s financial reviews show that the median
of the sales-to-net fixed asset ratio was only 0.11,
which shows that the return on investment for these
Alaska water systems was 11% before expenses
are counted against sales. An examination of net
sales to net fixed assets would present an even more
discouraging picture of financial sustainability for
these same Alaska systems.
With their internal funding for replacement of
assets falling far short of the amounts required to
replace or improve capital equipment, many water
systems are unprepared for the future. In our review
of Idaho applicants for revolving loans, 75% of the
systems fell into this category. More troubling is that
the systems studied are a tiny subset of the 2,100
public water systems regulated by the State of Idaho.
Our sample suggests that capital improvement
planning and capital budgets are non-existent for the
majority of systems and that existing user charges
are not sufficient to the fund the full costs of providing
service. The costs of replenishing the productive
assets needed to provide water service are either
ignored or under-funded. If small water systems
have similar financial liabilities from state to state, it
seems likely that the majority of small systems across
the country are underfunded.
What other factors contribute to the problem of
sustaining financial capacity? Customer perception
of the cost of service, which is conditioned by the
price they are accustomed to paying for water, is
one factor. Related to that perception are the
problems of calculating the full costs of service for
a water system to be financially sustainable and of
persuading customers that full-cost pricing is
necessary.
Customer Perception of Cost of
Service
In presenting numerous long-term budgeting, rate
setting, and capital asset financing workshops to
small water systems in the northwest states of
Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, some
common themes emerge. First, those who attend
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those workshops are usually motivated by a need
for capital financing and a desire to understand the
impact of that financing on existing budgets. Second,
upon realizing that most capital resources that may
be received require repayment with interest, the
attendees are anxious to minimize the increase in
user charges that may be necessary to support
additional debt service. Third, many attendees are
not happy to discover that acquisition of capital
resources may require that user charges be adjusted
to include other costs that have not been
incorporated into those charges previously.
It is in these workshops that “reality” meets the
customer perception of cost of service. This
customer perception is conditioned by the price paid
over time for water service. Even if water has been
“under-priced”—as compared to the full cost of
providing it (the “reality” mentioned above)—
customers seem to react to any increases in charges
or costs imposed by governments regardless of their
legitimacy.  More troubling is the “sticker shock”
reaction of customers to rapid and significant price
increases necessary to compensate for delays in
system improvements or failures to properly reserve
resources for future capital improvements.
Figure 1 represents the underfunded water system
that has not planned for the future and experiences
a major unanticipated event that requires additional
resources. That event—usually unanticipated
because of a lack of proper planning—requires new
capital facility funding (debt financing because of a
lack of capital reserve funds) and new facility
operating funds above the current increasing
operating expenses (line ab). The trigger for capital
replacement can be a breakdown of system
components or a change in regulatory standards that
requires new technology. The new full-cost funding
level (line ef) is above the prior full-cost level (line
cd), which was above the level of funding previously
supported by user charges. The double arrow
represents this change in funding that the customers
must now bear. In this scenario, the greater the
distance between the current and new full-cost
funding levels, the greater the sticker shock and
customer resistance to user charge increases.
Returning to the EFC’s analysis of applicants to
the State Revolving Fund, the customer perception
of current cost and future cost relative to capital
acquisition should not be a limiting factor to user
charge increases. The EFC examined the
affordability of the applicant water systems’ current
user charges and future user charges relative to
incurring DWSRF debt financing. Affordability of
user charges has been defined by the State of Idaho
as less than 1.5% of median household income. The
median values for current and future user charge
affordability were significantly below the state
threshold of 1.5%. Current charges amounted to
0.76% of median monthly household income while
the charges required to cover operations plus needed
capital improvements amounted to 1.0% of median
household income. This situation leads one to
conclude that the real problem is not the affordability
of the needed charges but the illusion that is created
when rates are held substantially below true costs.
GASB 34: An Additional Driver for
Full-Cost Pricing of Service
New accounting standards for government-owned
public water systems will have some effect upon
managers and board members of water systems
regarding full-cost pricing. The Governmental
Accounting Standards Board’s (1999) Statement 34
requires that governments adequately express the
extent to which the public has invested in public
infrastructure as well as its financial plan to protect
that investment. These requirements became
effective for governments with sales of less than
$10 million beginning June 15, 2003. Water systems
have two options for reporting capital investments
and reinvestment to the public. The first approach is
the traditional depreciation of assets method, and
the other is an asset replacement methodology
(modified approach). Finance managers and
accountants seem to prefer the depreciation method
because it is easier to calculate. The modified
approach seems to be preferred by utility managers
because it generates an inventory of capital assets
which respects the real differences of useful life
and condition for specific assets.1  Professional
organizations such as the American Society of Civil
Engineers have presented strong arguments for the
latter (Koechling, 2004). Water systems seeking to
establish full-cost pricing benefit from using the
modified approach because its asset management
methodology provides detailed information for
persuading customers of the need to reinvest in the
water system through increased user charges. It is
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too soon to tell which approach will be preferred by
smaller entities.
Conclusions
The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996 transformed how drinking water systems are
to be evaluated. The traditional measures of
performance relative to the quality of drinking water
delivered from the tap have now been expanded to
include fiscal and financial management.
As a microcosm of America’s small community
water systems, applicants to the Idaho Drinking
Water State Revolving Fund have a poor record of
preparing their water systems to be financially
sustainable and resilient in an operating environment
that is constantly changing. While further empirical
study is necessary, it is reasonable to expect that
America’s smallest public water systems, as a
general rule, are not fully funded through user
charges. While operational costs are probably being
met in most cases, capital replacement and
reinvestment costs are not. This situation poses
financial and other risks to the current and future
customers and owners of water systems.
A major obstacle to achieving sustainability is
customer resistance to rate increases. Failure to
adjust rates regularly as the real costs increase lulls
consumers into a false sense of the true costs and
increases the difficulty of making significant catch-
up adjustments. New governmental accounting
standards are transforming how information about
public infrastructure investment is presented to the
customers of governmental water systems.
Hopefully, this will help systems to justify more
consistent rate adjustments. Sustainable water
systems are those that fund the full costs of service
and that aggressively plan to acquire and restore
the capital assets necessary to consistently provide
safe drinking water.
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Notes
1  The modified method is incorporated in CAPFinance, a
software tool developed by the Region 10 Environmental
Finance Center to help water utilities develop long-term
capital budgets and to incorporate capital costs in user charge
systems. See http://sspa.boisestate.edu/efc.
